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1. ARVN soldiers with U.S. Special Forces,
Sept. 1968 (U.S. Army). 2. President Lyndon
B. Johnson visits U.S. soldiers at Cam Rahn
Bay, South Vietnam, Oct. 26, 1966; by
Yoichi Okamoto (LBJ Library). 3. A young
private during the Marine landing, Aug. 3,
1965 (NARA, USMC).
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4. USS Iwo Jima. U.S. Marines board Sikorsky
UH-34D Seahorse helicopters, Operation Dagger
Thrust, Dec. 1965 (USN). 5. Soldiers cover fire with
M60 machine gun, 1966 (U.S. Army). 6. Civilians
killed in explosion of Viet Cong mine, 1966 (DOD).
7. Vietnamese army personnel, May 1962 (DOD,
NARA). 8. Commanding General William C.
Westmoreland, MACV, Sept. 1967 (DOD, NARA).
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A Disconnected Dialogue
AMERICAN MILITARY STRATEGY, 1964-1968
GREGORY DADDIS
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IMAGE SOURCES: LBJ Presidential Library; Library
of Congress (LOC); National Archives and Records
Adm. (NARA); U.S. Army; U.S. Dept. of Defense
(DOD); U.S. Marine Corps (USMC); U. S. Navy (USN).
All images, except #18 and #21, are in the public
domain, obtained via Wikimedia Commons.
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9. PFC Michael J. Mendoza fires M-16 into suspected Viet Cong occupied
area during Operation Cook, Sept. 8, 1967, by Robert C. Lafoon (U.S. Army).
10. U.S. Navy Catapult Officer signals launch to a Douglas A-4C Skyhawk aboard
USS Coral Sea, South China Sea, March 24, 1965, by James F. Falk (USN).
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1995, Robert S. McNamara’s In Retrospect:

During the crucial years between 1964 and 1968,

(Times Books) hit bookstores. A mea culpa

what was possible in Vietnam, who was winning,

The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam

of sorts—hardly enough, his critics charged—the

former U.S. Secretary of Defense detailed the many
blunders and miscalculations leading to America’s
fateful loss in the Vietnam War. McNamara notably

conceded he had “erred by not forcing . . . a knock-

U.S. leaders failed to achieve any real consensus over
and whether or not the war’s political objectives were
worth the sacrifices necessary to achieve them.

On Virtue and Victory
American political objectives in Southeast Asia

down, drag-out debate over the loose assumptions,

had deep roots. By mid-1964, President Lyndon

military strategy in Vietnam.”

earlier administrations that seemingly left little room

the historical record, begs larger questions: How do

remained strong, as did assumptions underwriting

language do we use to describe a war that proved

ally fell to communism, other regional powers would

more importantly, for the millions of Vietnamese who

important that the Vietnamese were grappling with

to grips with a complex war, Americans, then and

era than the possibility the whole of Vietnam might

their conversations about a distasteful war. Terms

Without question, LBJ chose to commit the

unasked questions, and thin analyses underlying our

B. Johnson had assumed a strategic legacy from

The admission, supported by a careful reading of

for maneuver. Fears of communism’s global reach

we remember American strategy in Vietnam? What

the “domino theory” which presumed that if a U.S.

so tragic, not only for the United States but, perhaps

follow suit. To many Americans, it seemed far less

lost their lives in a decades-long civil war? In coming

issues related to national identity in the post-colonial

now, have relied on a series of tropes to streamline

fall under the evil influence of communism.

like “attrition,” “search-and-destroy,” and “body count”

United States to backing an independent, stable,

explorations of a multifaceted conflict.

Saigon government (GVN) seemed edging toward

momentous. As McNamara intimated, the failure

tance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and the American

to force an honest dialogue over deeper strategic

infiltration into South Vietnam by the communist

in Vietnam far outmatched the capabilities of the

insurgent National Liberation Front. If LBJ did not

have become convenient shorthand, replacing deeper

non-communist South Vietnam; in mid-1964, the

In fact, this bankruptcy in language proved

outright collapse. Reports from the U.S. Military Assis-

of civilian policymakers and senior military leaders

embassy relayed growing concerns of GVN instability,

questions ensured that policy objectives for the war

North Vietnamese Army, and militarization of the

U.S. mission there. The disconnects between policy

act, he feared, South Vietnam surely would fall.

crafted in Washington and military strategy designed
in Saigon go far in explaining the American outcome.

Such a decision partially rested on contemporary

notions about the utility of U.S. military force abroad.
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11. Young men from South Vietnam’s
44 provinces train for 13 weeks at the
National Training Center, 1970. Their job:
Help villagers help themselves (NARA).
12. Flame thrower during Operation New
Castle, March 26, 1967 (DOD, NARA).
13. Soldiers carry a wounded comrade
through a swampy area, 1969 (DOD,
NARA). 14. General William Westmoreland
and President Lyndon B. Johnson at
the White House, April 6, 1968, by
Yoichi Okamoto (LBJ Library, NARA).
15. Vietnamese Army troops in combat
operations against Viet Cong guerrillas in
marshy delta country, 1961 (DOD).
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EXCEPTIONALISM
Policymakers simply assumed American power would prevail.
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16. Second Lieutenant Kathleen
M. Sullivan treats a Vietnamese
child during Operation MED
CAP. Teams of U.S. Air Force
doctors, nurses, and aides
travel to villages to treat the
sick, 1967 (DOD, NARA).
17. Marine Company 1 soldier
on patrol south of Da Nang,
Oct. 30, 1969 (DOD, NARA).
18. Marines blow up bunkers and
tunnels used by the Viet Cong
during Operation Georgia, May
5, 1966 (DOD, NARA). 19. John
Kerry, spokesman for Vietnam
Veterans Against the War, April
21, 1971, by Warren K. Leffler,
U.S. News & World Report
Magazine (LOC).

Most Americans, still viewing victory in

Saigon government. Critical strategic

had political purpose. In the final phase,

power and virtue, saw few, if any, limits

means to political ends—were missing in

destruction while assisting Saigon in

Standard critiques of Westmoreland’s

the nation’s borders. Throughout all

World War II as proof of their nation’s
to what they could accomplish. In short,
almost any foreign policy problem could
be solved with the right mix of military

power, economic support, and developmental aid.

When Operation Rolling Thunder,

an extended bombing campaign against

North Vietnam in early 1965, failed to
deliver any appreciable gains, consensus
grew inside the White House for further

escalation. Johnson inched closer and
closer to deploying U.S. ground combat

troops in Vietnam. There was little discussion, however, about how best to use these

troops and how likely their deployment
would achieve U.S. political objectives in

Southeast Asia. As McNamara admitted,
senior policymakers simply assumed
American power would prevail and thus

maintain a noncommunist nation in
South Vietnam.

Power, Purpose, and Pacification

discussions—those matching military
the year of American escalation.

maintaining internal order and protecting

strategy contend the U.S. Army con-

phases,

wearing

Vietnamese army (ARVN), so, ultimately,

Westmoreland

improvements

units. In actuality, MACV undertook a

the Americans could hand over the war.

down

of

enemy

combat

comprehensive approach. Still, strategic
planning rested upon universally-held

assumptions about U.S. military power
and what it could deliver. Even with

presidential restrictions limiting the
war’s

geographical

boundaries

and

prohibiting the call-up of U.S. strategic
reserve

forces,

uniformed

leaders

remained optimistic that, over time, they
could fulfill Johnson’s political aims.

Westmoreland consequently devel-

oped a wide-ranging concept of operations in mid-1965. He not only had to

keep North Vietnamese army units, or
“bully boys” as he termed them, away
from the population, but also defeat the

The conception and implementation

fell to MACV’s commander, General

and villages. This dual-threat meant

World War II and the Korean War, and

military aspects of a political conflict.

Westmoreland was widely respected.

defending South Vietnam’s population

large. Throughout that crucial first year

allies would resume the offensive by

Vietnam, few policymakers sought to link

and the insurgency’s infrastructure.

to the military strategy being developed

Westmoreland intended security in-

the White House and MACV realized

process MACV defined as “establishing

of senior leaders questioned the feasi-

responsive to and involving participation

a strategy ultimately resting on a weak

population to the GVN. Battle, in short,

of U.S. military strategy in Vietnam

throughout South Vietnam’s hamlets

William C. Westmoreland. A veteran of

Westmoreland could not ignore the

a former West Point superintendent,

After first “halting the losing trend” by

His presence in crafting strategy loomed

centers, the U.S. and South Vietnamese

of American combat troop deployment to

attacking both enemy main force units
During

this

critical

phase,

in Westmoreland’s headquarters. Both

creases to facilitate pacification, a

difficulties were ahead, yet only a handful

or

bility of attaining lofty political aims with

of the people,” thus linking the rural

re-establishing

local

government

within

anticipated

centrated solely on “attrition,” the

local insurgency, the “termites,” operating

the president’s larger political objectives

MACV sought the insurgency’s complete

the

South

Casualties of War and Words
Many of those Americans, however,

found their mission in Vietnam as frustrating as it was deadly. Long, grueling

patrols across difficult terrain—through
dark jungles and muddy rice paddies—
frequently came up emptyhanded against
an elusive enemy. Insurgent attacks, in

the form of deadly ambushes, sapped
U.S. manpower in combat units, while

young American soldiers and marines
contended with mines, booby traps,

and the seemingly ever-present jungle

boot rot. For combat soldiers, it proved
an exhausting war. Worse (it seemed to

them), Americans were doing all the hard

fighting while their South Vietnamese
allies took a safer back seat. Such atti-

tudes were hardly fair (or accurate), as
demonstrated by the losses ARVN troops

and local territorial militia suffered
through years of continual conflict. Still,

the necessity to defeat the enemy in the
field while simultaneously protecting the

population from attack presented U.S.
troops with challenges as taxing as they
were complicated.

But such fighting held stark conse-

quences for the South Vietnamese popu-

lation as well. Military operations forced

families from their ancestral homes,

leaving a refugee population uprooted
and adrift for months at a time. The

use of herbicides, intended to deprive

the enemy of natural cover, destroyed
OKLAHOMA HUMANITIES
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COMPLICATED MISSION

Many troops could not make sense of a war requiring
them to simultaneously create (nation-build) and
destroy (defeat the enemy).

19

20

19. General William Westmoreland, flanked by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, left, and President Lyndon Johnson,
right, at a press conference outside the White House, April 7, 1968, by Frank Wolfe (LBJ Library, NARA).

crops and exposed rural farmers and

20. A U.S. Navy river patrol boat crewman during a day-long
patrol on the Go Cong River, Jan. 1967 (DOD, NARA).

Certainly, a multidimensional strat-

MACV’s definition of civic action, for

level. In the field, many troops could

military forces on projects useful to the

their families to dangerous chemicals.

egy risked uncertainty at the soldier

to tell friend from foe in a war without

not make sense of a war requiring them

local population at all levels.” But such

and destroy (defeat the enemy). Here,

loyalty to the Saigon government, a

his strategy to numerous audiences—

the allies frequently talked past each

ship, the press, his own troops, and the

to concepts of social revolution among

And young American soldiers, unable
front lines, often took a heavy-handed
approach when dealing with the popu-

lation. While atrocities like My Lai were
far from common, the South Vietnamese
lived on a landscape permeated by death,
destruction, and fear.

Battle also became a main compo-

nent of the war’s popular narrative.

Terms like “body counts,” “attrition,” and
“search-and-destroy”

quickly

evolved

example, intended to employ “indigenous

to simultaneously create (nation-build)

initiatives failed to inspire nationwide

Westmoreland struggled to articulate

necessity in a political civil war. In truth,

the White House, the Saigon leader-

other when relating military strategy

American public back home. By the end

South Vietnam’s population.

stemmed, forward momentum seemed

fication and, in 1967, created the Office of

wonder if the war had sunk into an

Support (CORDS), centralizing U.S.

of 1966, while the enemy tide had been

Still, MACV put its shoulder into paci-

lacking. Some observers began to

Civil Operations and Rural Development

uneasy stalemate.

efforts within military headquarters. As

Westmoreland ignored the war’s political

Limits of Military Force

too few of the war’s managers asked

heroic battlefield victories.

what LBJ called “the other war”—

more holistic strategy. Westmoreland’s

House aimed to export the Great

tasks—expanding the population living in

the president made clear his desire to

food-producing regions, and increasing

little debate accompanied decisions

The 1966 Honolulu Conference decree

could spur “revolutionary development”

Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA)

security with economic, political, and

capacity to put men in the field.” But

definitions of terms like “revolutionary

not preclude MACV from accomplishing

“pacification” habitually seemed out-of-

into mainstays of public discussions on

the war, overshadowing the allies’ more
nuanced strategic approach. To critics,

components in a misguided search for

in so many aspects of strategy, though,

The increasing focus on pacification—

Yet, a deeper examination finds a far

illustrated the ways in which the White

command focused on a wide array of

Society domestic agenda abroad. While

“secure” areas, ensuring the defense of

accentuate the war’s non-military aspects,

the usage of critical roads and railroads.

on how (or even if) U.S. military forces

charged Westmoreland to “attrite” Viet

inside

“forces at a rate at least as high as their

social development. American-centric

aiming for such a “crossover point” did

development,”

other important nonmilitary objectives.

step with rural realities in Vietnam.
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VIETNAM

South

Vietnam,

“civic

balancing

action,”

and

whether the American definition of
pacification was even feasible. How,

for instance, could foreigners establish
lasting bonds between local peoples
and their own government?

The pacification effort proved more

than just rhetoric. In the field, units like

the 4th Infantry Division instituted a “Good
Neighbor”

program

as

groundwork

for social and economic development.
Others, like the 25th Infantry Division

in Hau Nghia province, undertook civic

action projects: constructing schools,

hospitals, and churches; assisting in
agricultural planting, harvesting, and pro-

cessing; and furnishing food, clothing, and
medical supplies to the local population.

21
21. Marines patrol along the Quang Tri River, June 1967 (Russell Jewett [CC] Wikimedia Commons).

Once again, however, a broken

society. The social dislocation caused by

by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the

South Vietnamese seemed to undermine

being forced from devastated villages

war with itself.

dialogue between U.S. forces and the
any sense of lasting progress. Local
communities too often blamed Amer-

icans, rather than insurgents, for the
devastation brought upon their hamlets

and villages. ARVN officers and soldiers

chafed under the tutelage of overbearing
U.S. advisors who too often demeaned
them. And, across South Vietnam, local

large-scale combat operations—families

caught in the crossfire of war—under-

U.S. Army in Vietnam appeared to be at
Strategists despised the word “stale-

mined pacification plans and larger U.S.

mate.” This was as true in Hanoi as it

increasingly saw the ARVN as an occu-

Vietnamese leaders formulated a grand

policy objectives. The rural population
pying force, while the army itself was

racked by low pay, morale problems, and

was in Washington. By late 1967, North

offensive into South Vietnam aimed at
achieving a “decisive” military victory.

a lack of political training. Nor did the

Westmoreland’s command sensed some-

inroads into improving its legitimacy with

capacity to launch a major operation

On the American home front, a

It would soon become clear MACV had

Saigon government appear to be making

thing was afoot, but doubted the enemy’s

the people.

across the breadth of South Vietnam.

growing antiwar movement voiced

greatly underestimated their adversaries.

wrought by U.S. policies abroad. More

nist forces launched a countrywide

whether so much destruction was justi-

in late January and into February. For

White House officials believed they were

declared the war was being won. The

the other at home.

claims. Few areas in South Vietnam

Vietnam. Westmoreland’s headquarters

dent Johnson to initiate a wide-ranging

fully fought back enemy forces, the

over assessing progress. Military opera-

demonstrate progress in Vietnam.

dialogue had turned into a yawning cred-

countryside and Westmoreland struggled

came home to report on the war. But the

only two prospects seemed likely—either

standable way. All the while, the lack of

quently, an increasing number of politi-

managing the war or, perhaps worse,

dissent at home.

the army’s ranks, willing to question their

Either way, the war in Vietnam no longer

So contentious had the war become, that

DADDIS | cont. p. 61

province and district chiefs too often felt

helpless inside a deadly war being waged
across their landscapes.

Pacification surely gave testament

to a comprehensive allied strategy, but
that same strategy foundered, in part,

because of largely unexamined assump-

concerns over the devastation being

During the 1968 Tet holiday, commu-

and more Americans began questioning

offensive throughout South Vietnam

fied to achieve only a military stalemate.

months, senior U.S. officials had publicly

now fighting two wars—one in Vietnam,

Tet offensive now undermined all their

Such domestic tensions led Presi-

seemed safe. And while the allies success-

and the CIA engaged in a bitter battle

“salesmanship” campaign in 1967 to

damage had been done. A disconnected

tions made only temporary gains in the

Three times that year, Westmoreland

ibility gap. To many Americans at home,

to articulate his strategy in an under-

stalemate seemed only to harden. Conse-

U.S. military leaders had been inept in

demonstrable progress led to increasing

cally-conscious draftees began entering

their government had been lying to them.

government’s official narrative of the war.

seemed worth supporting.

tions about military force achieving
social and political aims in a civil war
over national identity.

The War for Public Opinion
By early 1967, many Americans

found it difficult to be optimistic about

Worse, the war seemed to be unrav-

eling the very fabric of South Vietnamese

OKLAHOMA HUMANITIES
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DADDIS | from p. 27
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, with its sepa-

rate yet increasingly integrated elements, now seems

less to ignite or intensify these speculations than to
subsume them—at least for the time of one’s contem-

plation of the Memorial itself—into more fundamental questions confronted on a personal level: Is
war worth the human costs? Can wars be classified
as just or unjust? Why did my friends die and not me?

Does seeing my reflection affect my relation to those
named, or to the war itself?

It was probably inevitable, even necessary, that

any memorial expression of a controversial war

Embracing War’s Complexities
In their postwar memoirs, many senior U.S. military officers would
argue they had won the war militarily but that Washington politicians
had lost it politically. After Tet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had requested
troop reinforcements, only to be denied by a president who would
decide in March not to run for reelection. After 1969, they claimed,
Congress and the Nixon White House had succumbed to domestic
pressures, walking away from South Vietnamese allies in their time of
greatest need. In this narrative, the military had done their duty only to
be forsaken by feckless politicians.
Yet another storyline arose in the postwar years: that Westmoreland

would itself be controversial. In the words of Maya

had mismanaged the war by committing to a senseless strategy of

years on, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial seems to

killing the enemy, dismissing the far more important aspects of

Lin, “To fly we have to have resistance.” Thirty-five
have reached a state of unifying equilibrium: between

the statuary figures of soldiers and nurses and the
names of their brothers and sisters carved in granite;
between what the Wall seeks to say to us and what we

are able to read for ourselves in its black stone pages.
Michael Herr, in Dispatches, speaks of hearing

this story from a soldier in Vietnam:

Patrol went up the mountain. One man came
back. He died before he could tell us what
happened.

“attrition.” In this tale, narrow-minded officers sought glory through
population security and the political conflict so central to determining
which side ultimately would prevail. No wonder, the narrative went,
that massacres like My Lai had occurred. In the process, any nuances
of American strategy were conveniently brushed aside.
Such competing narratives—neither one an accurate account of
American experiences in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968—offer valuable
perspective on how we talk about war. Our dialogue matters. The
American war in Vietnam proved far more complex than reductive
narratives would have us believe. And if we are to avoid similar fates,
of simply assuming that American military power is a panacea for

In the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is a text of that

any overseas social or political problem, then we must embrace those

happened, visualizing the thousands of promising

discussions of them.

as we stand at that Wall, can urge us toward a more

GREGORY A. DADDIS is an associate professor of history and director of

story. Though viewing the names cannot tell us what

lives lost, the sea of names that reflect our own faces
peaceful future.

GORDON O. TAYLOR is Chapman Professor of English
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